Abstract. Patients that access their health records take more care of their health and, when in therapy, commit more seriously to improve their condition. This leads to a more effective and more efficient healthcare management, and is also in agreement with European directives on data protection. However, accessing medical data can be risky. Security should be assured and it should be evident to the patients, who has access to what data and any violation to patient's privacy requirements should be reported. We call this property transparency. Precisely this work looks into the Transparency Enhancing Tools that have been proposed to increase people's awareness about security and privacy on the Internet, and discusses to which extent these tools can empower transparency in healthcare.
Introduction
European directives state how personal medical information should be managed and protected: patients must have access and control over their information, be informed about its content and purpose and give consent about its use and distribution [1] . Medical information is however peculiar. It should be owned by patients but is generated and managed by healthcare institutions and professionals who keep it in custody for, and often from, the patients. Especially in relation with Electronic Health Records (EHR), digital databases that contain the historical of patient's medical data, this situation creates conflicts. Granting patient's access to EHR is technically possible and this on the one hand seems to embrace patients' right to have control over personal data but, on the other hand, it may threaten data security and violate people's right to privacy [2, 3] .
So, why granting patient's access to EHR? The answer lies in studies that show that patients who are let to consult their medical data commit more faithfully to therapies, care more about their health, and communicate better with healthcare professionals [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Besides, the involvement of patients is a major element for the success of long-lasting medical monitoring programs that require patients with an history of the disease to share their health data over long periods of time. Here, patient's involvement not only should be supported but must be encouraged too.
One way to support patient's involvement and to meet legislation and regulations enforced on personal medical data, is to embrace transparency. Transparency suggests to be readable and intelligible to patients whether, whoever manages their medical data, protects their right for privacy, and how. As well, ensuring transparency should imply revealing and informing when a violation has happened and give the means to account violators. Transparency can be a way, we believe, to gain trust and foster patients to collaborate in medical programs.
But how to ensure transparency is unclear. Incipient research in healthcare does not provide effective solutions (see Section 4) . Proposals believed to guarantee a degree of transparency do exist but in other domains than healthcare. Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs), for instance, are meant to inform users about how their data are collected, stored, processed and disclosed by Internet service providers [9] . These are the tools that we intend to trail out in the medical domain. But since TET's have been proposed in completely different domains and come in a diversity of options, before migrating them to the medical area, we need to carefully assess their usefulness.
This paper studies TETs and analyses if their features can provide transparency for security and privacy requirements for tools that let patient's accessing their EHR.
Transparency for Security and Privacy
What does transparency mean in relation to security and privacy? The first impression is that transparency conflicts with both. How can the access to a resource be secured or private, and transparent at the same time? This apparent conundrum dissolves once one clarifies that transparency does not refer to the same objects as security and privacy do. Security and privacy are properties about the data. Transparency is a property about other properties: it empowers other properties by making evident to a human user their holding. A transparent security is a security that holds evidently, in contrast to an obscure security that holds stealthily. A transparent privacy has a similar meaning.
In particular, to secure the access to information means providing access to authorised users as well as protecting access from unauthorised users. This is usually obtained with access control [10] . Access control is not designed to be transparent, since such tools have not been designed to address regulation requirements stating that users must be informed. To become transparent, access control should be "visualized" in how it works to protect accesses to resources. This can be obtained by showing to the data owner, when and who has accessed his/her data, what application created them, where data are stored and whether accesses comply with the access control policies he/she has defined.
To ensure data privacy generally means to anonymize and obfuscate the data so that certain sensitive pieces of information, such as identities, are not easily revealed. For instance, medical data can have any link with patients' identification removed before being available for research. Privacy is usually obtained by applying Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) [11] [12] [13] [14] . PETs alone do not ensure transparency, again because they are not designed to address regulation requirements stating that users must be informed. To make PETs transparent, data owners should be informed that their records have been handled accordingly to declared policies and data protection laws. Notably, such practice has been proved to lead to higher perceived trustworthiness [15] .
Transparency empowers security and privacy, and it can be employed to make them verifiable, auditable and accountable [16] . Finally, we believe, transparency must give assurance that the data reported to users are accurately presented and faithfully coming from official sources. This means making integrity and authenticity transparent. The relation between transparency and these two last security properties deserves a research question in itself. It is beyond the scope of this paper's research and it is left for future work.
Transparency Enhancing Tools
Transparency Enhancing Tools (TETs) have been proposed in the literature to provide an accurate and comprehensible insight on how Internet providers collect, store, process and disclose user's private data. TETs attempt to provide a better understanding of privacy policies and an insight on third party's tracking behaviour. In so doing, TETs aim to promote security awareness [9] .
From research on currently available TETs it is agreed that there are some known desirable characteristics that they should offer. TETs should keep logs of what happens and inform a user when his/her security preferences are matched or when these are compromised. TETs should also offer functions that help a user to exert control over the personal data he/she has released [17] and should, in short, be proxies acting on the user's behalf and inform him/her when and how personal data are harvested, stored, and processed [9, 18] . For all this, the need for TETs has been repeatedly recognized [9] .
Moreover, TETs must be autonomous in interpreting user's policies, reveal any violation of these policies, and they should advise the user on how to proceed or who to contact when a policy violation occurs [11] . TETs have also been proposed as tools for auditing [18] . Visual tools for auditing are expected to be transparent in themselves (i.e., to produce their own logs and audit trails), so to prove how they have been used and on what data their decisions have been based upon. The auto-transparency, a property that would be desirable in general, is however meant to be read and understood only by professionals, and it is currently unavailable to lay users.
Transparency is believed to be a precondition for service improvement, data quality and productivity and a powerful driver for auditing and accountability: in healthcare, transparency has been suggested to empower patients and caregivers [19] . Excepting this, there is not much research on how transparency can be applied in the healthcare practice. We have not found research about transparency to empower patient's accessing their EHR, except some discussion about access control and usability requirements, which may be indirectly related to transparency issues [20] . Visualizing access control has been suggested as a mean to let a patient have an understandable overview of the EHR's network, with an inter-connected view showing which different medical departments share which sub-records of a patient's EHR. In this integrated view, a patient can select a part of his/her EHR and view in more detail who is accessing it and for what purpose. An example of such a tool was proposed in [20] and its security and privacy requirements have already been studied on previous research [21] [22] . Even less seems to exist about transparency and privacy in EHR.
In this still unexplored research, studies done in other domains can help to foresee what transparency can do for healthcare. For instance, it has been shown that personal data can be logged without compromising the privacy, and that users can verify what actions were performed on their private data and if these actions comply with a chosen privacy policy [23] . This is surely an interesting property but must be make usable before being handed-down to patients. Inspiring is the state of the art on TETs, the transparency enhancing tools introduced in Section 3. Each TET is meant to empower specific security and privacy aspects. We can thus compile a list of common security and privacy requirements for healthcare (in particular for EHR, see Section 5) and compare and discuss whether the TETs selected for analysis ( Figure 1 in Section 6) can empower those requirements. This is exactly the methodology we follow in this paper.
Security and Privacy Requirements in Healthcare
This section presents EHR's security and privacy requirements (focusing on access control and privacy) that need to be transparent to the patient when s/he accesses the EHR.
Access Control
RBAC: Role Based Access Control has been proposed in the ISO standard for EHR communications' security [24] and in the HL7 RBAC from the Healthcare Permission Catalog [25] . The ISO standard includes a description of healthcare roles, including the patient as subject of care, and defines a structure to organize the content of the medical record. Further, it includes sensitivity levels to express security levels for different types of data, and which roles can access those.
BTG: Break-the-glass has been proposed as part of access control in healthcare and gives the possibility to override (temporarily or as specified) the access control policy in a controlled manner, for instance, in emergency or unanticipated situations [26] ; PURUSE: Purpose of use has been suggested by the HL7 Security Technical
Committee [25] to associate the context with the access control rules. Examples of purpose of use that can be associated to specific accesses can be: emergency accesses, asking for a second opinion and research usage; EXCEP: Exceptions were proposed by research focusing on devising a patient's access control model [22] and their aim is, for instance, to give more or less permissions to a specific user than his/her role normally detains. Private notes are an example, i.e., healthcare professionals can be allowed to have private compositions relating to a patient's EHR therefore only accessed by the professional who created them and not by all the users that may detain the same role as that professional; TEMPCON: Temporal constraints were also proposed by [22] . These are needed to add a limited timeframe to access control permissions. TEMPCON can be specially useful for healthcare professionals that work on shifts. These constraints are also necessary in order to create temporary roles, which are defined for a specific limited time (e.g., delegation or BTG); DELEG: Delegation is also part of the model proposed in [22] and it allows granting temporary access permissions to healthcare professionals who normally do not treat the patient (i.e., asking for a second opinion). OBLS: Obligations in healthcare were proposed in [26] . These are secondary actions triggered by primary actions. In access control, obligations can be performed on a GRANT or DENY of an access request, for example, when a BTG is requested, an obligation can be triggered to send an email to the responsible authority to check whether that BTG access was valid or not; AUTH: European Directives [1] state that there needs to be a description of how personal data must be collected and processed. Regarding access control, this data can refer to patient's identification and authentication information (e.g., including patient's credentials for authentication and authorisation); SECAUTH: Secure authentication mechanisms with unique identification cards and one time passwords as well as secure authentication and authorization features are proposed in [21] ;
Privacy ANONYM: The European Recommendation on the Protection of Medical Data [27] states that patient's data identification has to be anonymised for specific purposes, for instance, for research or educational purposes.
Comparing Security Requirements with TET's features
We have studied twenty TETs. Figure 1 summarizes our work. In the first column we name the TET together with a reference and/or the url(s) where to find the TET's description or its specification. In the second column we give an acronym to the TET, which will be used later to identify each TET. In the third and last column we briefly describe the feature of the TET relevant to this paper's work. The considered TETs have been presented in very disparate domains. To compare them, we highlight in each TET what features it has that, somehow, adds transparency to security and privacy. We end up having eight categories, numbered from 1 to 8. Each category represents a feature to show, represent or visualize specific elements that we have judged relevant in respect to security and privacy. Namely:
1 -what roles access what owner's data 2 -how data about credentials are used and processed 3 -what data are shared among 3rd party institutions and professionals that can give away information about who uses that data, with some implicit information about their purpose of use 4 -how data about credentials are collected by 3rd parties 5 -how authentication credentials are securely stored 6 -if log entries are encrypted so personal data can be anonymised 7 -how data about authentication credentials are stored and collected 8 -what documents with authentication credentials are disclosed and to whom. Figure 2 shows the results of matching TETs with the security and privacy requirements listed in Section 5. TETs (listed in the first column) are compared with the requirements (listed in the first row). If a TET, say in row r, has a feature falling into categories from 1 to 8, say i, that we judge able to add transparency to a security and privacy requirement, say in column c, we write the number i in the cell standing at the intersection between r and c.
For example, in reference to Figure 2 , and for Mozilla Privacy Icons (MPI), we find a 1 under the RBAC and BTG (among other) columns. In fact, MPI engine detects what a website does with a user's personal data. For instance it detects whether the site gives (or never gives) data to advertisers, or whether it may sell (never sell) one's personal data, or whether the site may give (gives) data to law enforcement only when a legal process is followed. All such situations are represented with icons. The same mechanism, we judge, can be as well employed to visualize what roles access what owner's data (i.e., category 1). So it can make visually explicit RBAC policies as well as exceptions or BTG accesses to patient's data.
In summary, Figure 2 shows that nine of the twenty analyzed TETs have at least one feature that helps make transparent one access control or one privacy requirement. Surprisingly, more than half (eleven in twenty) of the analysed TETs did not fulfill any of the security and privacy requirements that we have identified. These TETs are simply add-on applications that add visualization effects to PETs, or enhance them with educational and awareness capabilities (more discussion on these results in Section 7).
Among the nine TETs that instead have relevant features for our study, seven provide transparency mostly for access control requirements. They relate It provides education on privacy related issues and helps the user to decide how much protection s/he wants.
Firesheep [9] FS An add-on that allows the user to retrieve cookies from people who have logged via insecure wireless networks. Provides transparency on user's own activities and demonstrates how easy user's login information can be stolen.
Panoptic lick [9] PA This tool tests user's browser to identify how unique the browser is, and therefore, easier to track.
Creepy [9] CRP This tool allows the user to collect geolocation information about users from social networking and image hosting services. Makes the user aware of the geolocation information that s/he sends when sharing on social networks and image applications.
Privacy Bucket [9] PBK Chrome extension that measures the extent to which third parties can discover demographic data about the user, based on user's browsing history.
Distributed Privacy Preserving Transparency
Logging [22] DPP A cryptographic scheme that enables data processors to inform users about the actual data processing that takes place on their personal data.
Transparent Accountable Data Mining [17] TA This tool allows users to run compliance checks of data usage policies on the transaction logs of web-based data flow among distributed data custodians, and generates user friendly justification for the results of compliance checks.
Amazon Book Recommendation System [17] AMA This service recommends different books to the user based on user's previous purchases. By clicking a link in the recommendation a window will appear which tells the user which of the previous purchases were used to generate the recommendation. The user can then choose whether s/he wants to remove any of the input purchases from the profile so that it is not used as a base for recommendations any more.
Provenance Tracker Network [14] PTN This is a decentralized network of peer servers that maintain the usage logs. No single entity can exercise ownership over the entire collection of log records. Usage logs are encrypted such that only the owner or the data subject of the sensitive data item included in the log record will be able to access it. with showing how personal data are used, processed and collected both by the application at hand as well as by third parties (i.e., categories 1 to 4, 7 and 8). This includes the collection and processing of authentication credentials (e.g., user identification and passwords). Only two among these nine TETs fulfill the privacy requirement ANONYM. They do so because they provide a way to detect and flag whether encryption is used on logs (i.e., category 6).
Discussion and Conclusion
We believe that TETs features can be a starting point to provide patients with information regarding how their personal data are being used, who has accessed them, for what purpose, when and where data are stored. This visual information can be extended to the parts of a patient's EHR that are being shared among third parties and, hopefully, also for what purpose. This information can be presented to the user depending on specific needs, roles, contextual information and other variables. Almost half of the analyzed TETs can be useful in this situation as they can provide for transparency in such different ways (i.e., with images, icons, text, visual interactive interfaces). However, further analysis is required to decide which of these features better adapt to the patient's centered tool, not only in terms of usability as described, but also in terms of security goals. A patient's access control model may require more fine-grained access control and versatile accesses (e.g., access by a patient's guardian or by family members) and this may necessitate the integration of different features, such as those required to distinguish roles and identities. For this purpose, we need to look more carefully and in deep detail in the TETs' features and techniques available, in future research. In this paper we considered only one privacy requirement which, in more precise terms, relates to anonymization. Only two TETs provide features that can be applied to add transparency, in order to show that data are anonymized. Again, the TETs in question have ways to flag that encryption is used on data. This can be a first step to protect patients' identity as well as more sensitive information, but anonymization cannot simply be achieved by encrypting data. Other solutions for transparency beyond flagging that encryption is used are thus required to detect and report that anonymization is guaranteed. It seems that we may have to look into research outside TETs for this purpose.
Other Considerations. Our analysis of TETs revealed features, not shown in Figure 2 and not directly related with transparency, which we believe deserve to be mentioned and discussed.
(a) Current TETs are mostly about improving PETs by adding "easier to understand" visual features into the way information regarding privacy policies is presented, so to improve usability features: we have seen that TETs can provide transparency for most of our proposed access control requirements but, during our analysis, we could not find details on what techniques and mechanisms are used to, for instance, detect, collect and process user's private data in relation to Internet browsing. Some TETs features can provide (simple) visual means to display information usage and checking of what private data users and thirdparties can access and for what purpose. These visual means are a key factor to provide transparency for patient's access control. It must be possible for lay and non-lay users to easily see and understand whatever is in compliance with their privacy policies but also what has been breached.
(b) Current TETs are mostly introduced to provide awareness and education to the user : in fact, the majority of users do not regularly read privacy policies, and even when they do, these are very hard to understand and do not usually support user's decisions on what to do on a website [28] . Nevertheless, other research shows that people appreciate that a website is concerned about their privacy. People buy more often and more expensive goods from web sites that publicly declare that they care about protecting the privacy of their customers (e.g., see [29] ). Besides, it has been proved that usable privacy policies foment trust [30] . Therefore, usability is a fundamental requirement that must be considered in addition to security and privacy. Unfortunately, there was not much data available concerning usability experiments and results for the TETs analysed in this paper.
(c) Current TETs mostly analyse user's behaviour on the Internet to profiling their needs in terms of privacy: the information of insecure behaviour derived from this profiling can help the user to be more careful of their privacy when using the Internet. Profiling techniques can be used as well in a patient's access control tool, raising alarms to patients when an access violation occurs, so making them more attentive for signs and specific issues that would be normally ignored.
Limitations. The TETs reviewed in this paper have been described in other reviews [9, 18] or in proprietary websites that give insight about TETs features. We did not use, test and analyze the TETs ourselves. This is left for future work. Also, we did not discuss usability of the considered TETs. But usability is a key feature, since a TET may fail to communicate its message clearly. How to measure this gap between intention to communicate a message and success in communicating that same message is intensively debated in usable security. We have considered usability requirements out of scope in this paper's analysis.
